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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Supreme Court has become increasingly aggressive

in its efforts to protect the autonomy of state governments from what the
conservative members of the Court have characterized as inappropriate
intrusions by Congress. Under the leadership of Chief Justices William
Rehnquist and John Roberts, the Court has developed a number of different
doctrines that have been used both to protect the structural integrity of state
governments and to preserve the ability of those governments to make
important policy decisions without congressional interference.' The casualties

of the Court's newfound assertiveness in this area include parts of federal

1.
See, e.g., infra note 22 and accompanying text; Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484-85 (2018).
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statutes designed to deal with issues ranging from civil rights, 2 health care,3
the regulation of sports gambling,4 and the protection of the environment. 5
However, the conservative justices 6 who have been the most vociferous

in defending state autonomy against congressional intrusion have shown far
less concern for preserving the structure of the federal system when reviewing
state government action. Like Congress, the Supreme Court is an institution
of the federal government. Thus, when the Court strikes down a state statute,
it imposes a federal rule that by definition limits the policy options available
to state governments in much the same way as statutes adopted by Congress
constrain those options. Nonetheless, in cases dealing with constitutional
claims that implicate other values conservatives hold dear, the same justices
that frequently invoke the concept of federalism to invalidate congressional
statutes have often dismissed the relevance of federalism-related concerns
almost out of hand.7
This article will contrast the conservative justices' eagerness to limit the
powers of Congress in the name of preserving state autonomy with their
willingness to ignore or downplay the same concerns when considering the
merits of arguments that state government actions are unconstitutional. The
article begins by briefly discussing the reasons that state autonomy is valued
within our federal system. The article then describes conservative justices'
efforts to protect state governments from congressional action and juxtaposes
those efforts with the conservative justices' decisions that impose significant
constraints on state governments with little or no concern for the impact those
decisions may have on state autonomy.

2.
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013) (invalidating the
preclearance requirement within the Voting Rights Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997) (determining that states are not subject to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993).
3.
See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'nof Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (prohibiting
the federal government from penalizing states that failed to comply with the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act).
4.
See, e.g., Murphy, 138 U.S. at 1485-85 (determining the federal government cannot
prohibit states from authorizing sports gambling).
5.
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (invalidating the take
title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act).
6.
For purposes of this essay, the term "conservative justices" refers to Chief Justices
Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts as well as Justices Lewis Powell, Sandra
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil
Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.
7.
See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
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THE VIRTUES OF STATE AUTONOMY

The idea that state governments should enjoy a substantial degree of
autonomy is a central tenet of the American constitutional system. For
example, in The FederalistPapers, James Madison famously declared that

"[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined[while] [t]hose which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite." 8 In addition, he noted that
"[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity
of the State." 9

Although the amendments adopted after the Civil War were designed to
enhance the federal government's authority, those who drafted the
Reconstruction amendments were also committed to the idea that the states
should retain a substantial degree of autonomy.' 0 For example, a precursor to
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was defeated largely because a
number of mainstream Republicans believed that the proposal would have
unduly expanded the powers of the federal government and "utterly
obliterate[d] State rights and State authority over their own internal affairs.""
Additionally, a formulation of the Fifteenth Amendment that would have
provided broader constitutional protection for voting rights was rejected in
part because some Republicans complained that, if adopted the proposed
language would have "overthrow[n] and uproot[ed] the very foundations of
the State constitutions."1 2 Against this background, Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase insisted in 1868 that "it may be not unreasonably said, that the
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as
much within the design and care of the Constitution, as the preservation of the
Union and the maintenance of the National government." 3
While Chief Justice Chase may well have based his assumption on a
formal conception of the nature of the Constitution's governmental structure,
a number of commentators have argued that respect for state autonomy has a

8.
9.
10.
11.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
Id.
See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 57 (1990).
Debate in the Senate on the ConcurrentResolutions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1866, at

1; see MALTZ, supra note 10, at 56-57.
12. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1037 (1869); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1034 (1869) (statement of Sen. Roscoe Conkling) ("Had the Senator considered how
far this may revolutionize and undo the constitutions, the enactments, and the customs of the
States?").
13. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
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variety of practical virtues as well.' 4 For example, Michael W. McConnell has
observed that:
The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized
government is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and
local tastes, while a national government must take a uniform-and
hence less desirable-approach. So long as preferences for
government policies are unevenly distributed among the various
localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision
making than by a single national authority.' 5

McConnell also noted that "federalism has been thought to advance the
public good [so] that state and local governmental units will have greater
opportunity and incentive to pioneer useful changes. A consolidated national
government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks
the goad of competition."' 6 Sounding a similar note in his dissent in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Louis Brandeis invoked what has become known

as the concept of "experimental federalism," famously asserting that "[i]t is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' 7 Arguments
like these provided the backdrop for disputes that arose over the significance
of state autonomy in the evolution of constitutional law during the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.18
III. THE FALL AND RISE OF STATE AUTONOMY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE

The Supreme Court's treatment of federalism-related issues has
undergone a dramatic transformation in recent years. During the final years of
the Warren era, commentators might have been forgiven if they assumed
constitutional protection for state autonomy was a relic of a bygone era. For
example, cases such as United States v. Darby, Wickard v. Filburn,
Katzenbach v. McClung, and Maryland v. Wirtz seemed to have established

the principle that Congress possessed sweeping authority to regulate both
private activity generally and working conditions for state and local

14. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the FramersDesign, 54 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987).
15. Id
16. Id at 1498.
17. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson,
Justice John M. Harlan and the Value of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1193 (1971)
(invoking the term "experimental federalism" as a theory of Brandeis).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995).
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employees in particular.' 9 Similarly, in a group of decisions including South
Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court held that

Congress also had broad power to control the electoral process by which
voters chose both federal and state government officials. 20
However, as conservative justices joined the Court in increasing numbers
during the post-Warren era, they brought with them a vastly different attitude
regarding the scope of the powers that the Constitution grants to the federal
government. As early as 1970, the influence of newly-appointed conservatives
was felt in Oregon v. Mitchell, where, for the first time in decades, the Court

relied on the doctrine of enumerated powers to hold that Congress lacked the
authority to set a minimum age for voters in state and local elections. 21 Six
years later, the defenders of state autonomy won another important victory in
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, wherein the Court overruled Marylandv.

Wirtz and held that Congress could not prescribe minimum wages and
maximum hours for state and local government employees who were engaged
in "traditional governmental functions." 22
Considered in isolation, neither Mitchell nor Usery had great long-term

practical significance. The passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
effectively overturned the holding in Mitchell,23 while the 1985 decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority formally overruled

Usery.24 Nonetheless, Mitchell and Usery proved to be portents of things to
come.

Beginning in the early 1990s, as the ideological balance of the Supreme
Court shifted even further to the right, the conservative members of the Court
showed an increased willingness to impose limits on congressional authority
in order to protect what they characterized as constitutionally-mandated
principles of federalism. 25 In some cases, conservatives have taken actions
designed to ensure that the "integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the
States" is not undermined by federal statutes. 26 In others, the same justices

19. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Marylandv. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
20. South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbachv. McClung, 384 U.S. 641, 650
(1966) (noting that Congress has power to expand scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections).
21. 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970).
22. 426 U.S. 833, 852, 855-65 (1976).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
24. 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011).
26. Id. at 221 ("The federal balance is, in part, an end in itself, designed to ensure that
States function as political entities in their own right.").
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have sought to limit the nature of the substantive issues over which Congress
may assert its authority.2 7

The defenders of state autonomy have deployed a variety of doctrinal
arguments

in their efforts to prevent Congress from undermining the

independence of state governments. For example, in decisions such as
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and Alden v. Maine, conservative

majorities concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from
subjecting state governments to damage actions for violating federal
statutes. 28 Additionally, in New York v. United States and its progeny, the

conservative justices formed the core of the majorities holding that the socalled "anti-commandeering doctrine" prevents Congress from requiring state
officials to participate in implementing federal policies. 29 However, the 2013
decision in Shelby County v. Holder is perhaps the most well-known and

controversial case that established constitutional protections for the formal
independence of state governments. 30
In Shelby County, the justices revisited an issue that the Court had first
confronted nearly fifty years earlier in South Carolinav. Katzenbach.3 1 In

Katzenbach, the Court was faced with a challenge to multiple provisions of
the recently-adopted Voting Rights Act of 1965.32 One of the most
controversial sections of the statute prohibited a designated group of states
from implementing changes in state electoral processes without first obtaining
27. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995)
(invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
28. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 759 (1999); see also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars state employees from recovering "money damages
by reason of the State's failure to comply with the . . Americans with Disabilities Act"); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (finding that a "clear statement of Congress' [s]
intent to abrogate the States' immunity" exceeds Congress's authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 64748 (1999) (using the Fourteenth Amendment to bar Congress from enacting legislation that
"expressly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement").
Compare Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (rejecting a constitutional challenge
to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act), with Nev. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Family and Medical Leave Act).
29. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal government cannot require states
to take title to low-level nuclear waste); see also Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138
S. Ct. 1461, 1484-85 (2018) (holding that the federal government cannot prohibit states from
repealing prohibitions on sports gambling); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
588 (2012) (striking down a portion of Affordable Care Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 934-35 (1997) (holding that the federal government cannot require local officials to
perform background checks).
30. See 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013).
31. 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).
32. Id.
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approval from the federal government. 33 This requirement was, by any
standard, an extraordinary federal intrusion into the power of a state
government to structure its own political processes. 3 4 Nonetheless, in
Katzenbach, a majority of the justices concluded that all provisions of the
statute were constitutional.35
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren conceded that the
imposition of the preclearance requirement was "an uncommon exercise of
congressional power "36 At the same time, however, he observed that
"exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise
appropriate." 37 Thus, noting that "Congress felt itself confronted by an
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of
[the] country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution"
and that less dramatic measures had failed to solve the problem, Chief Justice
Warren concluded that Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment provided
Congress with the necessary authority to enact all provisions of the Voting
Rights Act.38
Chief Justice Warren also rejected the contention that Congress had run
afoul of the Constitution in this context by subjecting a small group of states
to particularly stringent federal regulations. 39 He observed:
Congress . . learned that substantial voting discrimination presently
occur[ed] in certain sections of the country, and it knew no way of
accurately forecasting whether the evil might spread elsewhere in the
future. In acceptable legislative fashion, Congress chose to limit its
attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed
necessary.40

'

Turning to the specifics of the coverage formula, which relied on voting
rates to determine which states would be subjected to the preclearance
requirement, Chief Justice Warren also asserted that "a low voting rate is
pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must
inevitably affect the number of actual voters" and concluded that "the
coverage formula is [therefore] rational in both practice and theory." 4

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 357-58 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
See id. at 358-60.
Id. at 337 (majority opinion).
Id. at 334.
Id.
Id. at 309, 337.
Id. at 328.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 330.
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At the time that the Voting Rights Act was enacted, the preclearance
requirement was set to expire in five years. 42 However, Congress repeatedly

extended the duration of this provision and ultimately adopted a twenty-five
year extension of the mandate in 2006.43 While the coverage formula had
undergone minor revisions in the interim, the determination of whether the

preclearance requirement applied to a particular jurisdiction was still based on
the conditions that existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 44
Against this background, the concept of preclearance faced constitutional
challenges on a number of occasions during the late twentieth century. 45
However, it was not until 2009 that a majority of the justices first indicated
they had serious doubts about the constitutionality of the 2006 extension. 46
Four years later, in Shelby County, the five conservative members of the Court
explicitly concluded that the extension was unconstitutional. 47
Speaking for the Shelby County majority, Chief Justice Roberts reiterated
the characterization of the preclearance requirement as "extraordinary
legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system" 48 that constituted an
"extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between the
States and the Federal Government." 49 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts
contended that the decision to impose the requirement on some, but not all,
state governments ran afoul of the principle that "all the States enjoy equal
sovereignty" 0 and that any departure from this principle required a showing

that "[the] statute's disparate geographic coverage [was] sufficiently related
to the problem that it target[ed]." 5 1
Chief Justice Roberts conceded that, in 1965, both the imposition of the
preclearance requirement itself and the content of the formula used to
determine which jurisdictions were subjected to the requirement were justified
by the conditions existing at the time. 52 At the same time, however, Chief

42. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 538 (2013).
43. Id. at 538-39; Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 7, 120 Stat. 577,
581 (2006).
44. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 538-39.
45. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 268-69 (1999); Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526, 540 (1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 (1980).
46. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009)
(expressing doubts about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act's preclearance
requirement).
47. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 556-57.
48. Id. at 545 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211).
49. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502
U.S. 491, 500-01 (1992)).
50. Id. at 545 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211).
51. Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
52. See id. at 545.
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Justice Roberts cited a variety of evidence that, in his view, demonstrated that
African-Americans in the southern states had far greater opportunity to
participate in the political process than statistics from the 1960s and 1970s
suggested. 53 Thus, insisting that the 2006 extension "impose[d] current

burdens and [needed to] be justified by current needs,"" Roberts concluded
that the original coverage formula could no longer be used to identify states
that would be required to preclear their changes in the electoral process.55
Despite its condemnation of the existing preclearance requirement, the

Shelby County majority did not purport to question Congress's authority to
take other measures designed to prevent state and local governments from
discriminating on the basis of race in the political process.5 6 By contrast, in
decisions such as City of Boerne v. Flores, the conservative justices

successfully prevented Congress from determining which substantive rules
would apply in certain situations. 57

Ironically, the sequence of events that ultimately led to the decision in
Boerne began in 1990 with Employment Division v. Smith, a case in which the
Court emphasized the need to defer to legislative judgments. 58 In Smith, a
group of Native Americans using the drug peyote for sacramental purposes

argued that, by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
they were entitled to an exemption from a state law prohibiting the possession
of the drug in all circumstances. 59 In concluding that the Constitution does not
require a state to grant such an exemption, the majority rejected the apparent

implications of several earlier cases suggesting that the decision not to provide
such an exemption should be subject to strict scrutiny. 60
Speaking for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia based this conclusion on a
classic argument for judicial deference.61 Justice Scalia conceded that "[i]t
may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in."

62

Nevertheless, asserting that "[v]alues that are protected against

government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not
thereby banished from the political process," Justice Scalia insisted that "that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
53. See id. at 547-58.
54. Id. at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
55. See id. at 551.
56. See id. at 557.
57. See 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000) (invalidating a provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
58. See 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
59. See id. at 874.
60. See id. at 881-85.
61. See id. at 890.
62. Id.
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system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs." 63
The decision in Smith generated a political firestorm. 64 Responding to the
demands of a broad-based coalition whose membership cut across political
lines, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in
1993.65 RFRA provided that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden

a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability" unless the imposition of the burden is in furtherance of a
"compelling governmental interest" and is the "least restrictive means" of
furthering that interest. 66 The statute passed unanimously in the House of
Representatives and with only three dissenting votes in the Senate. 67
In Boerne, the justices evaluated the constitutionality of RFRA in the
context of a zoning dispute between a local religious organization and the
municipal government of Boerne, Texas. 68 After the city denied the church a
permit to physically expand due to its location in a historic district, church
officials filed suit in federal court claiming RFRA required the city to grant
the permit. 69 The city responded by arguing that Congress lacked the
constitutional authority necessary to force state and local governments to
conform to the requirements of RFRA. 70 In their rejoinder, those defending
the application of the statute contended that Congress could derive the
necessary authority from section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.71
Given the Court's emphasis on the importance of deferring to the
democratic process in Smith, one might have expected the justices in Boerne
to defer to the judgment of Congress and reject the constitutional challenge.
In fact, however, five justices joined an opinion by Justice Kennedy in which
he concluded that RFRA could not constitutionally be applied to the rules
adopted by states and their subdivisions. 72
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy distinguished sharply between
the power to determine the scope of constitutional rights, which he argued
belonged only to the courts, and the power to create remedies for violations
of those rights, which he conceded belonged to Congress. 73 While
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993), invalidated by City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 3(a)-(b).
67. 139 CONG. REC. 27239-41, 26416 (1993).
68. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
69. Id. at 512.
70. See id. at 517.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 509-11.
73. See id. at 519-29.
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acknowledging that Congress has broad discretion to devise remedies, he
contended that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."7 4
Though the defenders of RFRA sought to analogize Boerne (decided more
than a decade before Shelby County) to cases in which the Court had upheld
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Justice Kennedy
observed that, unlike the hearings that provided the predicate for the passage
of the Voting Rights Act, none of the witnesses called to support the passage
of RFRA alleged recent instances of widespread, intentional discrimination
by a state or local government against either specific religious groups or
religious organizations generally. 75 Against this background, Justice Kennedy
insisted that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or

preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior" and that Congress's effort to regulate the
activities of state governments could only be viewed as an unconstitutional
attempt to change the substantive content of the Free Exercise Clause. 76
Shelby County and Boerne exemplify the types of cases in which the
conservative members of the Court have successfully attracted majority
support for decisions limiting the power of Congress. Additionally, groups of
conservative justices have, at times, dissented in cases where a majority of the
Court refused to impose additional constitutional constraints on the scope of
congressional authority.77 But, whether in the majority or in dissent,
conservatives have often stressed the need to preserve state autonomy in cases
challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes. 78 By contrast, the same
74. Id. at 520.
75. Id. at 530.
76. Id. at 532, 534-36 (describing the intended effect of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 and Congress's right and duty to interpret the Constitution "within its
sphere of power and responsibilities").
77. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(asserting that criminalizing "grow[ing] small amounts of marijuana in one's own home for
one's own medicinal use" is beyond the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause); id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that in the context of medical marijuana,
the "federalist system, properly understood, allows California and a growing number of other
states to decide for themselves how to safeguard the health and welfare of their citizens"); Nev.
Dep't Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741-42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("If we apply the
teaching of these and related cases, the family leave provision of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(C), in my respectful view, is invalid to the extent it allows for private suits against
the unconsenting States.").
78. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 217 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("State autonomy with respect to the
machinery of self-government defines the States as sovereign entities rather than mere provincial
outposts subject to every dictate of a central governing authority."); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court's
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group of justices has been largely oblivious to the impact that other actions of
the Court have on the ability of state and local governments to implement
policy decisions tailored specifically to the needs and preferences of their
constituents. 79
IV. THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON STATE AUTONOMY

A.

State Autonomy and JudicialReview of State GovernmentAction

'

By its nature, the idea that the Supreme Court has power to reverse
decisions made at the state or local level poses a significant threat to state
autonomy. The Court is an institution of the federal government that, like
Congress, makes decisions establishing uniform rules that all parts of the
nation are compelled to respect. 80 Thus, when the justices invoke the
Constitution to invalidate a policy judgment made by state or local authorities,
the Court's action is no less significant than a federal statute in terms of its
impact on a state's ability to either effectuate the distinctive policy preferences
of its local populace or to act as a "laboratory of democracy." 8
Indeed, in some situations, the potential threat to state autonomy that
judicial review creates may be even more significant than that posed by the
existence of a national legislature. As Herbert Wechsler has observed, the
structure of Congress provides some protection against the passage of statutes

that might unduly intrude on state autonomy. 82 Federal statutes only become
law if passed by majorities in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. Because each of these bodies is comprised of members selected by the
voters of individual states and their subdivisions, these members owe their
primary allegiance to those specific voters, rather than to the population of the

opinion purports to recognize that the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked
to justify federal regulation.").
79. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018);
McDonaldv. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (plurality opinion).
80. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 378-79 (1816).
81. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass'n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2484 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("[T]he regulation of alcohol wasn't left to the imagination of [the
Supreme Court] of nine sitting in Washington, D.C., but to the judgment of the people
themselves and their local elected representatives. State governments were supposed to serve as
'laborator[ies]' of democracy." (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
82. See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism:The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559
(1954).
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nation at large.83 As a result, when proposed federal legislation threatens the
policy preferences of many states, one would expect the representatives of
those states to vigorously oppose such legislation and do whatever is
necessary to prevent its passage. Against this background, Wechsler asserts
that, because of what he characterizes as "the intrinsic sensitivity to any
insular opinion that is dominant in a substantial number of states," 84 Congress
often defers to such "insular opinion[s]" and declines to take action even
where the action is "called for by the voice of the entire nation." 85
By contrast, given the manner in which the makeup of the Supreme Court
is currently determined, there is no reason to believe-in the abstract at
least-that similar considerations would create incentives for members of the
Court to respect state governments' autonomy. In recent years, geography

does not appear to have played any discernible role in the selection of
Supreme Court justices.8 6 Instead, each sitting president selected nominees
whom he believed would support the jurisprudential and ideological agenda
of the national political coalition to which he owed his election. 87
In theory, of course, such an agenda might include a truly robust
commitment to the idea that the federal judiciary should generally refrain from
invoking the Constitution to displace policy judgments made by state and
local governments. Indeed, in recent years, Republican presidential candidates
have insisted that they favored just such an agenda. For example, in 2004,
Republican George W. Bush was elected on a platform which declared that
"the self-proclaimed supremacy of . .. judicial activists is antithetical to the
democratic ideals on which our nation was founded,"88 while in 2016,
Republican Donald Trump ran on a platform which asserted that an "activist
judiciary" is a "critical threat to our country's constitutional order . .. that
usurps powers properly reserved to the people through other branches of
government" and called for the appointment of judges who "reverse the long
line of activist decisions . . . that have usurped . .. states' lawmaking
authority." 89

83.
84.
85.
86.
Identity,
87.

Id. at 546-47.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, andArticleIII Judges: Geography,
andBias, 79 MO. L. REV. 119, 177 (2014).
See NEAL DEVINS & LAURENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: How PARTISAN

DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 176 (2019) ("[P]residents ... have increasingly
taken ideology into account when appointing Supreme Court Justices.").
88.

REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM (Aug. 26, 2004),

https://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/GOP2004platform.pdf [https://penna.cc/TYM7-R885].
89.

REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., 2016 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM (July 18, 2016),

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2016-republican-party-platform#rebirth
[https://perma.cc/JP59-3LKS].
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Based on statements such as these, one might have expected the justices
chosen by both President Bush and President Trump to respect the autonomy
of state governments by consistently deferring to the policy decisions made
by those governments. However, this has not been the case. 90 In a variety of
circumstances, the appointees of both Bush and Trump have demonstrated a
willingness to actively intervene and limit state autonomy in order to advance
other aspects of the conservative political and jurisprudential agenda. 91 In
some cases, the conservative justices have simply ignored the issue of state
autonomy. In others, they have argued that any constitutional interest in the
preservation of state autonomy should be subordinated to other concerns. 92
Ignoring the Issue of State Autonomy: National Institute of Family

&

B.

Life Advocates v. Becerra
The recent decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.

Becerra provides a clear illustration of a case in which the conservative
justices ignored the impact of their position on the autonomy of state
governments. 93 Becerra was a constitutional challenge to The California
Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and
Transparency Act (the FACT Act), a California statute that required clinics to
provide two categories of specific information when offering services to
pregnant women. 94 First, the FACT Act mandated that clinics licensed by the
state notify women that California offers free or low-cost services, including
abortions. 95 In addition, the statute required licensed clinics to provide women
with a phone number to call for such services, while unlicensed clinics were
required to notify women that the clinics were not authorized by the state to
provide medical services.96
90. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 72728 (2011) (overturning public financing for elections on First Amendment political speech
grounds).
91. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261-62 (2020)
(invalidating a scholarship fund established by the Montana Legislature under the Free Exercise
Clause); Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1916-20 (2019) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a state cannot regulate one industry with the purpose of influencing
another industry that is preempted by federal law).
92. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 475-476 (2013) (expanding
federal preemption of state law to prevent higher burdens on drug manufacturers); Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017) (applying "most
rigorous" scrutiny to a Free Exercise claim and holding that it overrides a state's policy
preference).
93. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
94. Id. at 2368.
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1)-(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch.
372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
96. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2369-70.
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The attack on the FACT Act was, by its nature, an assault on the
autonomy of the state government of California. The institutions comprising
that government had determined that the interests of the people of California
were best served by the disclosure requirements. The Becerra Court was in
essence being asked to displace this decision by imposing a national standard
that would by its nature limit the ability of state governments to adopt policies
it believed reflected the distinct values of the populations that they
represented. 97 Nonetheless, Bush appointees John Roberts and Samuel Alito
joined Trump appointee Neil Gorsuch and holdovers Anthony Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas to form a five-justice majority that held the California
statute unconstitutional. 98
Despite the impact of this conclusion on California's ability to effectuate
the policy preferences of its citizens, the concept of state autonomy is never
mentioned in the majority opinion in Becerra. 99 Instead, the opinion engages

in a detailed discussion of the relationship between the FACT Act and the
First Amendment without even considering the possibility that the analysis
should be influenced by the impact that the decision might have on the ability
of state governments to adopt policies that reflected local conditions and
values. 100

The failure of the Becerra majority to discuss the relationship between its
decision and the structure of federalism is by no means unique. In several
other cases dealing with a variety of different issues, the conservative
members of the Court have concluded that actions taken by state and local
governments were unconstitutional without considering state autonomy as a
constitutional value.' 0 ' Moreover, even in those cases where federalismrelated issues have been explicitly addressed, the conservative justices have
frequently determined that concerns related to state autonomy should be
subordinated to other, more important values.10 2

97. See id. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Because] citizens strongly hold . . different
points of view [about abortion] . . it is particularly important to interpret the First Amendment
so that it applies evenhandedly as between those who disagree so strongly.").
98. Id. at 2378.
99. See id. at 2370-78.
100. Id. at 2371-78.
101. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,201921(2017) (analyzing the scope of the Free Exercise Clause); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564
U.S 552, 580 (2011) (evaluating the regulation of commercial speech); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (discussing affirmative action).
102. See, e.g., infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
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Downplaying the Significance of State Autonomy

In a number of cases decided by the Roberts Court, the conservative
justices have frequently acknowledged that invoking the Constitution can
significantly limit the autonomy of state governments.1 03 Until recently,
conservative members of the Court were often the most likely to argue that
the Court should act less aggressively in order to preserve that autonomy.1 04
However, more recently, the conservative justices have demonstrated a much
greater willingness to downplay the significance of autonomy when
determining the scope of constitutional limitations on state and local
governments. 105

The position taken by the conservative justices in McDonald v. City of
Chicago provides a striking example of this phenomenon.1 06 McDonald was

a challenge to the constitutionality of two city ordinances that, read together,
effectively banned the possession of handguns.10 7 Two years earlier, over the
objections of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court had
concluded in District of Columbia v. Heller that a similar ordinance passed by

a body subject to the federal government's control violated the Second
Amendment.1 08 Thus, McDonald featured a battle over the application of the
so-called incorporation doctrine-the theory that the strictures of the Bill of
Rights have been made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 09
During the late twentieth century, Justices John Marshall Harlan and
Lewis Powell, both of whom at that time were generally characterized as
being members of the Court's conservative wing,"10 emphasized the
importance of preserving state autonomy in resisting the notion that the Bill
of Rights should apply to the states "jot-for-jot and case-for-case.""' In
McDonald, progressive Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer made
similar arguments in contending that the Second Amendment, by its terms,

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See, e.g., infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 741 (2010) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 750.
554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 761-67.

110. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, John Marshall Harlan'sEnduring Importance for Current

Civil Liberties Issues, from Marriage Equality to DragnetNSA Surveillance, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 331, 334-35 (2017); Russell W. Galloway Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 379, 380 (1988).
111. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring injudgment) (quoting Duncan, 391
U.S. at 181).
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should not be applicable to the states."1 2 While both Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer focused specifically on the relationship between the Second
Amendment and the power of state governments, Justice Stevens also took
the opportunity to launch an assault on the concept of incorporation more
generally. 113
Justice Stevens conceded that "there can be significant practical, as well
as esthetic, benefits from treating rights symmetrically with regard to the State
and Federal Governments."" 4 But at the same time, invoking the concept of
experimental federalism, he asserted that "[i]n a federalist system such as
ours . . . this approach can carry substantial costs."" 5 Turning specifically to
the Second Amendment, Justice Stevens observed that:
The costs of federal courts' imposing a uniform national standard
may be especially high when the relevant regulatory interests vary
significantly across localities, and when the ruling implicates the
States' core police powers [such as the authority to regulate access to
firearms].... [T]he ability to respond to the social ills associated
with dangerous weapons goes to the very core of the States' police
powers."1 6
Similarly, describing the regulation of gun ownership as "the quintessential
exercise of a State's 'police power,"" 7 Justice Breyer complained that "the
incorporation of the right recognized in Heller would amount to a significant
incursion on a traditional and important area of state concern, altering the
constitutional relationship between the States and the Federal
Government.""1 8
Speaking for himself, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, Justice Alito insisted that such concerns did not undermine the case
for the incorporation of the Second Amendment.11 9 Justice Alito
acknowledged that the incorporation of the Second Amendment would "to
some extent limit" the autonomy of state governments and that
"[i]ncorporation always restricts experimentation and local variations."120
112. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 921-22 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
113. Id. at 873-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 869.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 869-70, 901.
117. Id. at 922 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)

36,62 (1873)).
118. Id. at 921-22.
119. Id. at 783-85, 790 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 790.
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Nonetheless, invoking the memory of progressive icon Justice William
Brennan, Justice Alito disparaged what Justice Brennan had described as "the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watereddown, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights."121
Considered in isolation, the position taken by the conservative justices in
McDonald might have been seen as a byproduct of considerations that were
unique to that case. Prior to its consideration of McDonald, the Court had
handed down a series of decisions establishing the principle that state
governments are subject to those aspects of the Bill of Rights that are
"fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty."1 22 Against the backdrop of
this principle and the decision in Heller, much of Justice Alito's opinion in
McDonald was devoted to an examination of the historical evidence that, in
his view, demonstrated that an individual's right to own handguns was
"deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" and that, in particular,
such a right was widely viewed as fundamental at the time that the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted and ratified.1 23 Thus, in the absence of other
evidence, Justice Alito's response to the arguments of Justices Stevens and
Breyer could have been characterized as a byproduct of respect for established
precedent, rather than a lack of respect for the concept of state autonomy more
generally. However, the dispute over gun control is not the only context in
which the conservative members of the Court demonstrated a willingness to
subordinate state autonomy to other considerations.
The reaction of the conservative justices to issues of equality in public
education provides another example of the inconsistent treatment of state
autonomy in conservative constitutional jurisprudence.1 24 In the 1973
decision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, conservative justices

relied heavily on this concept in rejecting the claim that Texas's system for
financing public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.1 25 There, over
the objections of the progressive members of the Burger Court,'1 26 Justice
Lewis Powell spoke for the five most conservative justices on the Court who
121. Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1964)). In a separate opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas also concluded "that the
Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms set forth in the Second
Amendment [is] 'fully applicable to the States."' Id. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (quoting id at 750 (plurality opinion)).
122. See id. at 763-67 (plurality opinion) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
n.14 (1968)) (discussing the initiation of selective incorporation and move toward "inquir[ing]
whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty
and system of justice").
123. Id. at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)); see id. at 767-78.
124. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973).
125. Id. at 40-44, 58-59 (discussing state autonomy and the Equal Protection Clause).
126. Id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 70-137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the Texas system should be subjected only to the deferential
rational basis test.1 27 In his defense of this contention Justice Powell

emphasized the need to preserve the autonomy of state and local governments,
observing that:
While "[t]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost
consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional

provisions under which this Court examines state action," it would
be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to
abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence
in virtually every State.1 28

At times, conservative justices also cited similar concerns in opposing
sweeping remedies in school desegregation cases involving systems that had
never been formally segregated by law.1 29 For example, dissenting in
Columbus Boardof Education v. Penick, Justice William Rehnquist observed

that "local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance
of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process."' 30 While conceding that "[this fact] does not, of course,
place the school system beyond the authority of federal courts as guardians of
federal constitutional rights,"' 3 ' Justice Rehnquist asserted:
[T]he practical and historical importance of the tradition does require
that the existence of violations of constitutional rights be carefully
and clearly defined before a federal court invades the traditional
ambit of local control, and that the subsequent displacement of local
authority be limited to that necessary to correct the identified
violations. 132

In 1991, speaking for a majority comprised almost entirely of the
conservative members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist sounded a similar

127. Id. at 40-41 (majority opinion). Justice Byron White also advocated the use of the
rational basis test in Rodriguez but concluded that the Texas system was unconstitutional even
under that approach Id. at 68-70 (White, J., dissenting).
128. Id at 44 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Allied
Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
129. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452-55 (1979).
130. Id. at 490 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974)).
131. Id.
132. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons,

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
74

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72: 55]

note in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell.133 There, in

emphasizing the need for the federal courts to return control of school districts
to local authorities once vestiges of past de jure segregation had been
eliminated to the extent practicable, he observed that "[1]ocal control over the
education of children allows citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and
allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs."1 34
Additionally, he declared that:
Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local authorities have
operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time
properly recognizes that "necessary concern for the important values

of local control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's
regulatory control of such systems not extend beyond the time
required to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination."13 5
However, the subsequent decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 demonstrated that the conservative

members' enthusiasm for maintaining local control of schools did not extend
to the adoption of policies that the conservatives themselves deemed offensive
for other reasons.1 36 In ParentsInvolved, the Court confronted constitutional

challenges to race-conscious measures that had been voluntarily adopted by
the school boards in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, in an
effort to improve the racial balance of the public schools in those cities. 17 The
context in which the Louisville plan had been adopted was, in some respects,

particularly striking.1 38
Prior to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,139 the city of

Louisville and nearby Jefferson County had operated separate school systems,
both of which were segregated by law.14 0 By 1959, the city had eliminated
formal racial segregation in its public schools, and the county soon

133. Compare Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250-51 (1991) (casting
the deciding vote despite previously opposing efforts of the conservative justices to limit the
scope of remedies in school desegregation cases), with, e.g., Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 490 (rejecting
the position takenby conservative justices and upholding the authority of a district judge to issue
a sweeping desegregation order).
134. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted).
135. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d
1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
136. 551 U.S. 701, 720-21 (2007).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 715-17.
139. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140. See Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755-56 (W.D. Ky.
1999).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/6

20

Maltz: Faint-Hearted Federalism: The Role of State Autonomy in Conservat
2020]

FAINT-HEARTED FEDERALISM

75

followed.141 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit later determined that neither the
city nor the county had adequately addressed the problem of segregation.1 42
In 1975, the district court entered an order that, among other things, required

the two systems to be consolidated, established guidelines for the racial
composition of each school in the combined system, and directed the local
authorities to take the steps necessary to ensure that those guidelines were
met. 143

Although the guidelines themselves were modified in 1996, the school
district remained under the formal supervision of the federal district court until
the year 2000.14 In that year, finding that "the [School] Board
has demonstrated extraordinary good faith and has accomplished all the
purposes of the [Desegregation] Decree" and that "[t]o the greatest extent

practicable, the Decree [has] eliminated the vestiges associated with the
former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects," the district court
dissolved the decree, thereby leaving the school board free to set its own
attendance policies.1 45

At that point, the school board could have reverted to a policy of assigning
all students to the schools nearest their homes.1 46 However, cognizant of the
fact that adopting a pure neighborhood school plan would exacerbate the
racial imbalance in many schools within the system, in 2001, the board
adopted a method for assigning students that was designed to avoid this
result. 147 While both geography and individual choice played an important

role in the assignment plan, the plan also provided that African-Americans
should comprise between fifteen and fifty percent of the student body in each
school-the same parameters that had been established by the 1996 school
desegregation order.1 48 As a result, some students who would otherwise have
been allowed to attend a specific school were unable to do so because of their
race. 149 This reality provided the backdrop for the constitutional challenge to
the Louisville plan in ParentsInvolved.15 1
In some important respects, the issues presented in ParentsInvolved bore

a striking similarity to those that had been before the Court in the Penick

141. See id.
142. Newberg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cnty., 489 F.2d 925, 93132 (6th Cir. 1973).
143. Id. at 762.
144. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 715.
145. Hamptonv. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
146. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 715-17.
147. See id
148. Id. at 716; Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 768 (W.D.
Ky. 1999).
149. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at716.
150. Id. at 717-18.
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case nearly thirty years before.151 Both cases involved
student assignment systems that had been devised by local
with important educational or operational objectives in mind.15 2
both cases, the justices were called upon to overturn those

systems in the interest of advancing a particular vision of racial justice.1 53

Not surprisingly, the defenders of the Louisville plan relied in part on
arguments similar to those that had been made by then-Justice Rehnquist in
the Penick case.15 1 Thus, in ParentsInvolved, Justice Breyer observed that
"[j]udicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint" and that "[b]y and large,
public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities." 5 5 Justice Breyer also noted that in Rodriguez and a variety of
other cases, "this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own
communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet
the educational needs of their pupils."1 56 Relying on these considerations,
Justice Breyer insisted that, in cases like ParentsInvolved, the Court should
defer to the "knowledge, expertise and concerns" of local school boards.15 7
However, these arguments left the conservative members of the Parents
Involved Court unmoved. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that the overt consideration of race
by the school districts in Louisville and Seattle was unconstitutional.1 58
Responding to Justice Breyer's plea to defer to the judgment of local
authorities, Chief Justice Roberts simply observed: "Such deference 'is
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. We put the
burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are

justified. "'159
The conservative justices were equally dismissive of federalism-related
concerns in Janusv. American Federationof State, County, & MunicipalState
Employees, Council 31160 and Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona

151. Id.; Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 453 (1979).
152. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 715-17; Penick., 443 U.S. at 452-53.
153. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 715-17; Penick, 443 U.S. at 452-53.
154. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 717, 723; Penick, 443 U.S. at 490 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
155. 551 U.S. at 849 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Eppersonv. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 848.
158. Id. at 721-25 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 744 (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1
(2005)).
160. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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Independent Redistricting Commission.161 In Janus, with the Court divided
once again along ideological lines, the five conservative justices voted to
overrule the decision in Abood v. DetroitBoardof Education162 and held that
a union representing government employees could not constitutionally require

non-member employees to pay agency fees that were designed to cover the
cost of activities that were germane to the process of collective bargaining.1 63
In her dissent, Justice Elena Kagan noted that the rule established by the
majority in Janus imposed significant limitations on the autonomy of state
governments.1 64 Implicitly invoking the concept of experimental federalism,
Justice Kagan observed that, at the time the decision was handed down, the
nation was engaged in "an energetic policy debate" over the question of
whether government employee unions should be allowed to charge agency
fees.1 65 Although twenty-eight states prohibited the imposition of such fees,
the fees were lawful in twenty-two states.1 66 Justice Kagan complained that,
by virtue of the Court's decision, the "debate [now] ends," and that, in the
future, all states would be required to follow the rule established by the
majority in Janus.167

Justice Alito's majority opinion made short shrift of this argument.1 68
Justice Alito conceded that the Court should not "'pick the winning side [in
policy debates]'-unless the Constitution commands that [it] do so."1 69 He
also acknowledged that the decision in Januswould deprive states of a policy
option that had previously been available to them.'7 0 Nonetheless, noting that
"when a . .. state law violates the Constitution, the American doctrine of
judicial review requires [the Court] to enforce the Constitution," Justice Alito
insisted that "[i]n holding that [the laws at issue in Janus] violate the
Constitution, [the Court is] simply enforcing the First Amendment as properly
7

'

understood."

The willingness of most of the conservative justices to subordinate the
concept of state autonomy to other norms was reflected even more clearly in
their approach to the issues presented by Arizona State Legislature.7 2 The

dispute in that case centered on a recently-adopted provision of the Arizona
state constitution, which had removed the authority to draw congressional
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

576 U.S. 787 (2015).
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
Id. at 2501-02 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2501.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2465-86 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2486 n.28.
See id. at 2485 n.27.
Id. at 2486 n.28.
576 U.S. 787 (2015).
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districts from the Arizona state legislature and vested that authority in an
independent commission established solely for the purpose of creating
districts for elections to the House of Representatives and state legislature.17 3
Those challenging the constitutionality of this regime argued that, with respect
to the creation of congressional districts, the Arizona constitutional provision
ran afoul of the Elections Clause, which provides that, in the absence of
congressional legislation, "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof." 7 4
Justice Kennedy joined his four progressive colleagues in rejecting this
challenge. Speaking for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asserted:
"The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the historical record bears
out, was to empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict
the way States enact legislation." 7 5 However, the four most conservative
justices on the Court-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito-dissented,1 76 with Chief Justice Roberts insisting:
The constitutional text, structure, history, and precedent establish a
straightforward rule: Under the Elections Clause, "the Legislature" is
a representative body that, when it prescribes election regulations,
may be required to do so within the ordinary lawmaking process, but
may not be cut out of that process.17 7
Whatever else one might say about the merits in Arizona State
Legislature, one point is indisputable: The approach taken by the progressive

majority left state governments with far greater autonomy than that embraced
by the conservative dissenters. All of the justices were well-aware of this
reality. 78 Thus, in her majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted: "It is
characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to establish
their own governmental processes .

. . ."'79

Additionally, she invoked the

vision of the laboratories of democracy and observed that "[d]eference to state
lawmaking allows local policies more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society, permits innovation and experimentation, enables
greater citizen involvement in democratic processes, and makes government

173. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg.).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
175. Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 814-15.
176. Id. at 824-50 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 854-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
859-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 841 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
178. See id at 816 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
179. Id. (citation omitted).
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more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry."1 80
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts' dissent focused on a very different
aspect of the concept of vertical federalism.' 8 ' After observing that "[t]he
Elections Clause both imposes a duty on States and assigns that duty to a
particular state actor," 8 2 Chief Justice Roberts noted that "[t]he States do not,
in the majority's words, 'retain autonomy to establish their own governmental
processes,' if those 'processes' violate the United States Constitution,"' 83 and
that "[i]n a conflict between the Arizona Constitution and the Elections
Clause, the State Constitution must give way."1

84

This argument stands in stark contrast to the argument that Chief Justice
Roberts himself had made only two years earlier in Shelby County v. Holder.
Both Shelby County and Arizona State Legislatureinvolved efforts to impose

limits on the ability of state governments to control their own political
processes.1 85 In Shelby County, the limits were imposed by the preclearance
requirements of the Voting Rights Act.18 6 There, notwithstanding the lack of
any clear textual limits on the power of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts had relied heavily on what he
characterized as "basic principles" of state autonomy to impose significant
limitations on the powers of Congress.18 7 By contrast, although Chief Justice
Roberts had observed in Shelby County that "[d]rawing lines for congressional
districts [remains] 'primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,"'188 he
gave no apparent consideration to the general principles of state autonomy in
Arizona State Legislature in concluding that the relevant provision of the

Arizona state constitution ran afoul of the federal Constitution.1 89
More generally, the arguments made by the conservative justices in
ParentsInvolved, Janus, and Arizona State Legislature reflect a fundamental

misconception regarding the nature of the federalism-related concerns raised
by progressives in those cases. The progressive justices were not contending

that state governments were entitled to enforce laws that were in conflict with

180. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211,
221 (2011)).
181. See id. at 824-50 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 826 (citation omitted).
183. Id. at 827 (citation omitted).
184. Id. (citing Cook v. Gralicke, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001)).
185. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534-35 (2013); see supra notes 172-184
and accompanying text.
186. See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 534-45.
187. See id. at 544.
188. Id. at 543 (quoting Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 392 (2012) (per curiam)).
189. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 827
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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the mandates of the Constitution.1 90 Instead, Justices Breyer, Kagan, and
Ginsburg were asserting that the bedrock principle of state autonomy is one
of many factors the Court should take into account when determining how
best to interpret the language of the Constitution.191 By contrast, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito at least implicitly suggested that the Court should
consider the import of relevant constitutional provisions in the abstract,
without considering the impact of that interpretation on the preexisting
prerogatives of state governments.1 92

In short, the conservative justices have been far from consistent in their
treatment of state autonomy in cases raising constitutional issues. Decisions
like Becerra,ParentsInvolved, and Janushave had as great a negative impact

on the autonomy of state government as at least some of the congressional
enactments that the conservative justices have found offensive on federalismrelated grounds. Conversely, in Arizona State Legislature, the autonomy of

the Arizona state government emerged unscathed only because the
progressive justices rejected the arguments made by Chief Justice Roberts and
his conservative compatriots.1 93 Of course, one might make analogous
observations about decisions such as Obergefell v. Hodges and Whole
Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, where progressive justices invoked the

Fourteenth Amendment to impose federal standards and displace the
judgments of individual state governments.1 94 Nonetheless, one point should
be clear: If the conservative members of the Supreme Court are truly
concerned with maintaining state autonomy, they should be far less willing to
overturn state and local enactments on constitutional grounds in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
Recognizing that decisions such as Becerra, ParentsInvolved, and Janus
significantly restrict state autonomy has important implications for our

understanding of the nature of the issues that are at stake in constitutional
litigation more generally. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
discussions of the role that the federal courts do and should play in the
development of public policy focused in large measure on the relationship
between the judiciary and the popularly-elected branches of government.1 95
190. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 814-15.
191. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 80304 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Janusv. Am. Fed'nof State, Cnty., & Mun. State Emps., 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2501-02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 816.
192. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 827 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 807-22.
194. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015); Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
195. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
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Thus, as Richard H. Pildes has observed, recent scholarship regarding
constitutional theory "has been uniquely dominated . . by the struggle to
rationalize judicial review with democracy,"1 96 with some commentators
arguing that the Supreme Court acts as a countermajoritarian force in
American society while others insist the decisions of the Court typically
reflect the views of the governing majority.1 97
However, in cases challenging the constitutionality of state laws, the first
question to be asked is whether the Constitution demands that the relevant
policy judgment be made at the federal level rather than the state level. In
some cases, the Constitution does create nationally applicable rules of law
that, by their nature, limit the options available to state governments. But in
the absence of such a nationally applicable rule of law, state and local
governments are free to take any action that they wish, and the federal courts
must respect the decision of a state government even if the relevant decision
was not made by a popularly elected branch of that government.1 98
Of course, in individual cases, reasonable minds may differ over whether
the Constitution creates a binding national rule that states must respect.
Nonetheless, the fundamental point remains. In reviewing the actions of state
and local governments, all federal judges-whether progressive or
conservative-should be aware of the impact their decisions have on the
autonomy of state governments. Otherwise, they are simply ignoring the

structure of the Constitution and the principles on which it is based.

196. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a MajoritarianInstitution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 104.
197. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962) ("[W]hen the Supreme Court declares

unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of the
representatives of the people of the here and now .... "); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 185 (2006) ("[T]he Supreme Court
has followed the public's views about constitutional questions throughout its history .... ").
Compare Barry Friedman,

The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the

CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155-62 (2002) (discussing the
evolution of the academic debate over the proper characterization of the relationship between
judicial review and the concept of democracy), with Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian
Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to ConstitutionalOrder, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361,

362 (2008) (discussing how academic debate has now evolved from concern over democratic
deficits in the courts to electoral institutions).
198. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (rejecting a
federal constitutional challenge after the California Supreme Court recognized an appellee's
right to "exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellant's property").
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